Re: practical epistemology

Jim (AGJDE@ASUVM.INRE.ASU.EDU)
Fri, 25 Nov 1994 14:56:19 -0700

In response to J. McCreery,

I am not sure where the connection between empowerment, colonialist
ethnographies and quantum physics can be made except that in each case I
assume that our reasons for engaging in those activities is directed, and
that the goal is tacitly to gain understanding or meaning. The original
posting concerned epistemology, our way of knowing, a subject which is not
essentially different in physics or anthropology if we assume that we all
share common mental and physical attributes which limit our perceptions. There
is a tacit and poorly recognized thread of empiricism in Anthropology, and one
which is not easily discarded despite rhetoric to the contrary. The fact that
we assume that we can discover a common knowlege relies ultimately on the
perspective that there is a common reality shared by all parties, and that
it can be described in mutually intelligible terms. Allied closely with this is
the a priori assumption that there are deterministic relations between things
we observe; that consequence follows cause. Failing this basic assumption
we are left with, at best, chaos theory and at worst complete relativism.
In either case there would be no point in studying the precise relations of
anything, human or otherwise, since meaning would be entirely singular and
post hoc.
I am not saying that this is in fact not the case, nor that the "world"
as humans view it is anything more than a combination of chaos and cause, but
only that the raison d'etre of anthropology arises from the same asssumptions
that underlay the pre-Bhor physics. It is part of a western intellectual
tradition and world-view inseperable from our own culture, language and
history. The idea that we can separate ourselves entirely from this
epistemology while attempting to "understand","give meaning" or "gain
knowlege" of other cultures is as niave as the condescending studies you
mention. It is just as condescending to assume that we can "understand" what
others think, feel, or see. If we assume we can, then we are assuming quite
a bit, and we are making the same assumption in essense that the astronomer
makes in computing an orbit. The epistemologies, not the phenomenae, are
very much the same in their basic forms.
I do not much support the de-constructionist position simply
because there has not been an adequate epistemological alternative proposed.
No one who took basic western philosophy should be suprised by this empasse.
Do you have an alternative metaphysic, or will anthropology raise itself up
by its Boasian bootstraps?

Jim Eighmey
Department of Anthropology >>>---------->
Arizona State University
Tempe, AZ. 85287-2402

Jim Eighmey
Department of Anthropology >>>---------->
Arizona State University
Tempe, AZ. 85287-2402

Jim Eighmey
Department of Anthropology >>>---------->
Arizona State University
Tempe, AZ. 85287-2402