Tarski's Truth

Frederic W. Gleach (fwg1@CORNELL.EDU)
Sat, 18 Dec 1993 13:11:25 -0500

Bob Graber was right; I had remembered his statement incorrectly,
substituting proofs in my mind where he had written of solutions. And as
for being in over one's head, it's at least as true of me as him. As we
may both attest, Tarski's argument is more complex than presented here, and
warrants reading. While there are parts of it I might disagree with, it is
both interesting in approach and sophisticated in practice.
My apologies.

Graber wrote on 17 December:
>F. Gleach's memory for what Tarski wrote may be better than his memory
>for what I wrote about Tarski. He attributes to me the claim that
>"Tarski had 'proven' what truth is" and then seems to imply that I think
>Tarski proved no other conception was *possible*. What I claimed,
>however, (and I quote) was that "the problem of the nature of truth was
>solved, for anyone who wanted a solution, by Alfred Tarski in 1944 . .
>." Other conceptions are of course "possible," including the belief that
>truth is an irremediably mysterious notion. Actually, I plead guilty to
>oversimplifying Tarski's argument, in that I was equating the
>"disquotational" argument with the semantic conception itself; I believe
>it is more accurate to consider the former only a part of Tarski's
>elaboration of the latter. If Gleach suspected I was getting in over my
>head, he was quite correct; so I will make for shore, wishing you all a
>pleasant weekend. --Bob Graber