Re: Alex's gibbon-like CA

Thomas Clarke (clarke@acme.ist.ucf.edu)
16 Nov 1995 13:41:34 GMT

In article <Pine.OSF.3.91.951113142406.700A-100000@curly.cc.utexas.edu> David
Froehlich <eohippus@curly.cc.utexas.edu> writes:

Continuing in my metascientific musings about PA.
First David says:

> Just because you cannot think of a manner in which this could have
> occured doesn't mean that it is impossible.

Which is frankly an apology for not yet having a good explanation
for something in a theory he likes.

David then goes on:

> ... testability and predictive power of
> hypotheses is the problem.

When discussing a theory he does not like.

Do I detect a contradiction?

Without explanation there can be no prediction. Without prediction
no testability. Hence the theory he likes is subject to the same
objections he applies to the theory he doesn't like.

Tom Clarke