Re: culture as gene-flow regulator: the arunta
Len Piotrowski (lpiotrow@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu)
Tue, 1 Oct 1996 16:29:30 GMT
In article <52q49g$3bh@mtinsc01-mgt.ops.worldnet.att.net> rs222@worldnet.att.net (Robert Snower) writes:
>[snip]
>Both Levi-Strauss and I see the constructed system of knowledge as a
>hypothesis. He sees the anthropological significance of that
>hypothesis in its parallels, its correlations, with real nature, or
>with our real modes of thought. When all such correspondences have
>been discerned, anthropology has concluded its task, and everybody can
>go home. I see the correspondences of the hypothesis with nature,
>etc., as utterly devoid of interest. We are not dealing with a
>scientific hypothesis, where the interest is properly in empirical
>verification. We are dealing with a pretense, a metaphor of reality,
>whose value lies in its departure from that reality. It is a fiction,
>admittedly. The measure of its value is not degree of correspondence,
>but degree of success--success in being selected for, in prevailing,
>over alternatives. Anthropology's task is to reveal the course of
>this process.
I guess I don't see structuralism as the same dead-end as you do. I think it
can inform quite a bit about the particular form of symbolic meanings emergent
in human social situations, and why these forms tend to persist.
>>>>>[snip]
>>You don't think that any person before the appearance of Western civilization
>>was capable of individual thought and action?
>It is not a question of capability. It is a question of values. Of
>what people see fit to think and do.
I guess in the realm of values I perceive culture as relative. To choose one
value system and relate it phylogenetically against another is presupposing a
historiography of values instead of an immediate understanding of meanings in
contexts and situations in which they are enacted in relations between human
actors. A difference of social-psychological metaphors I think.
>>>>>[snip]
>I can't put my finger on anything much to disagree with here. Perhaps
>I don't understand you.
I guess I'm saying that I understand the changes you refer to as wholly
cultural, understandable in it's own sense, yet not beyond the capabilities of
any human group, even prehistoric.
>>> "Self-interest" has
>>>become normative. It is a virtue. This is unique.
>>Not so! Thus my Ik example.
>Juat a tiny speck of diversity. An archaic bud that never bloomed,
>enduring unchanged down through the ages, as a monument to its own
>failure. The faint glimmer of a future for which it cannot claim any
>responsibility. Like me.
Unfortunately, it is a state reflected in many other places on the globe and
throughout time.
>>>Capitalism is the
>>>economics of self-interest. Democracy is the politics of
>>>self-interest. Similarly, "rights [individual]" has become uniquely
>>>normative.
>>None of these 'ideas' are particularly unique, nor restricted to Western
>>civilization.
>They are amazing fantastic constructions, definitive of 'historic,' as
>against pre-historic, culture. I am surprised you did not take issue
>with that characterization of democracy.
I don't know of any pure examples of "democracy" as you imply. The American
notion of democracy, interestingly, owes a lot to the practices of Native
American culture, which, although historically known, did not develop as part
of the Western tradition.
Cheers,
--Lenny__
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