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Re: Classifying Our NavelAdrian Tanner (atanner@MORGAN.UCS.MUN.CA)Wed, 17 Jul 1996 16:27:00 -0230
illusion, as Freud before him had done for that of 'hysteria'. Those of us, and here I associate myself with the recent posting of Martin J. Quinn-Meyler, who feel it unlikely that we will ever understand and account for *ritual* through focussed attention on a narrow range of particular social practices (least of all, I might add, practices engaged in, at least in part, as an apparently direct, motivated and self-concious attempt of members our own 'hot' society to produce innovation as a valued end in itself), believe that the issue of what ritual excludes or includes is to be found by using the power of anthropology's *comparative* and *contextual-empirical* frame of reasearch. Taking such an open perspective, we may either dissolve ritual as another 'hysterical' illusion, or (as I, pace Levi-Strauss himself, happen to think that he, using the afore-mentioned comparative but context-sensitive approach, showed us with respect to totemism) that there are may well be certain core elements and features regularly present in such a concept, but that the genius of particular cultures is that these elements get recombined in an almost infinite variety of surface representations, with the results never quite being the same. But this also means that, as with totemism, religion, marriage, or whatever entirely social, and therefore non-obigitory (in some sense), social practice we look at, we must be prepared to find that there may well be social groups (possibly even ourselves) who have found they can do without ritual altogether. I have always found the most significant aspect of anthropology to be not any revelation of what human nature (in a totally universal sense) consists in, but its revelation of practices that are yes, extremely widespread, but are still less than entirely universal. [Boyoyooing! to quote Ken Campbell - sorry, couldn't resist that, I caught one of his performances last night - he used it to signify sudden and profound revelation.] If we begin by assuming ritual to be universal (and this seems to be entailed by those who talk as if we were looking for the 'essence' of ritual as being close to our own human essence) even if ritual's universality should eventually turn out to be an established fact, we have thereby condemned ourselves from the start to studying something that, since universal, must be some aspect of a biological need, and for that reason (and here I venture a totally personal view which is probably simply a matter of aesthetic taste) uninteresting, if not trivial. Adrian Tanner Memorial University of Newfoundland
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