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Re: Reality checkJohn McCreery (jlm@TWICS.COM)Wed, 3 Jul 1996 08:22:02 +0900
"If one attaches to body mutilation the idea that it has to do with rampant individualism, detachment from society etc., then doesn't one have to explain why similar kinds of body mutilations are found in societies which are not individualistic in this way?" Adrienne Dearmas writes (personal communication), "One of the problems I have with this [McCreery's paraphrase of Chris Shilling] is that body mutilations are not a current phenomena, nor is their study. Bulwer gave us the first collection in 1650 in Anthropometamorphosis, and Flowers actually applied social theory to the practices in 1881 in "Fashion and Deformity." I would agree that the growing trend in America to mutilate the body is an attempt to create identity and group attachments, as the family, community and social groups are being broken down. As for symbolic immortality, I think this is why those who practice fgm hang onto it so fervently - what place does a woman have w/out a husband ?" I've been thinking about this, and since, in other connection, I've been reading Ulf Hannerz's _Cultural Complexity_, it has occured to me to borrow some ideas from Hannerz in trying to sort out the issue at hand. Hannerz approaches cultural analysis by looking at (1) ideas and meanings in people's heads (2) means of externalization, by which they are made public (3) the distribution of (1) and (2) in populations and social groups. This scheme is congenial to me because it parallels a series of conventional approaches to the study of language, i.e., (1') semantics and deep structures [what speakers and hearers have "in mind"] (2') phonology and surface structures [the audible and visible words that pass between them] (3') the distributions of (1') and (2') across populations and groups Typically we learn about 1 & 1' by talking to people. We learn about 2 & 2' by observing what they do. To get in a serious way at 3 & 3' we have to do systematic, quantitative research. As Hannerz points out, most cultural analysis [and this, I note, applies as much to philosophers, art historians, literary critics and other cultural studies types as it does to cultural anthropologists] stops at 1 and 2. We leave 3 to sociologists, market researchers, and other uncouth types, whom we accuse, often correctly, of lack of sophistication in deciding what to count. [It is a rare researcher--Bourdieu in _Distinction_ is one_ who who has the time, energy,inclination and other resources required to span the whole process.] Coming, then, to the problem at hand: Shilling's starting point is concern with what he sees as growing sociological interest in the body, a subject largely ignored or taken for granted in classic (aka 19th and 20th century) sociological theory. As a reader I observe that the theory to which he refers (Weber, Durkheim, Marx, etc.) is largely a high-modernist project. The later authors to whom Shilling refers (Bourdieu, Elias, etc.) are, in various ways, reacting against the separation of mind and body and the focus on mind (neglecting or simply ignoring the body) characteristic of the great modernists. As Rosemary and Adrienne point out concern with the body and, indeed, practices that do something to it (training, tattoos, mutilations, decorations=TTMD, for short) have a near universal distribution in human societies. We then find ourselves observing that TTMD occur both in societies where they are *obligatory* for members of certain social categories and in societies where they are *optional* means for those attempting to create new identities outside established categories. At this point, I, at least, am feeling muddled. Here is where Hannerz helps me out: (1) Shilling is talking at the level of ideas and meanings in the work of social theorists. He suggests that the theorists' interest in the body reflect wider social changes. Could those changes be largely restricted to the theorists' own milieu? That's a distributional question. (2) Shilling (he is a sociologist after all :-))has relatively little to say about the means of externalization used to assert control over the body.Could we, perhaps, describe the range of TTMD practices as, to use Bourdieu's term, a "space of social possibles"? I am no expert on tattoos or mutilations. I am, however, fascinated when I read about the 17th/18th century American gentry described in _The Refining of America_ and discover the same stress on the gentleman's standing and sitting straight that Bourdieu describes as characteristic of French elite behavior, Confucius prescribes in the 6th century BC, has a clear echo in the practice of Zen, and also appeared, to close the circle, in the Boy Scout Manual. I can't help wondering if there is a limited range of possibilities here that are open to some sort of systematic description. (3) With that description in hand, we might then return to the distributional issue and ask why various forms of TTMD are obligatory or optional/accepted or rejected by people in various social positions. We might even be able to say something reflexively sociological about the theorists that Shilling describes.... (4) I note, in passing, that as the case of language warns us, we cannot simply assume that a particular visible form of behavior reflects a given set of ideas and meanings behind it. Here an example from marketing. The Chevy Nova bombs in Latin America. The guys at GM have failed to note that in Spanish "No va" is "no go." John McCreery 3-206 Mitsusawa HT, 25-2 Miyagaya, Nishi-ku Yokohama 220, JAPAN "And the Lord said unto Cyrus, 'Shall the clay say to him who moldest it, what makest thou? Let the potsherd of the earth speak to the potsherd of the earth." --An anthropologist's credo
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